Module 1: Threat identification and risk analysis(2/4)

Vulnerability identification for OT assets

40 min4 min readRef: IEC 62443-3-2 §5.3

title: "Vulnerability identification for OT assets" duration: "40 min"

What counts as a vulnerability in OT?

In IT, a vulnerability is typically a software bug with a CVE number. In OT, the definition is broader: any weakness that a threat source can exploit to compromise the security of a zone.

This includes software bugs, but also:

  • Protocol-level weaknesses — Modbus has no authentication. This is not a bug; it is a design decision from 1979. It is still a vulnerability.
  • Default credentials — the Unitronics PLC at Aliquippa had a default password. The vendor documented it in the manual.
  • Architectural weaknesses — a flat VLAN spanning multiple Purdue levels is a vulnerability, not a misconfiguration.
  • Process-knowledge gaps — an operator who does not recognise a suspicious setpoint change is a vulnerability in the human layer.

Key takeaway

OT vulnerability = any exploitable weakness

Do not limit your assessment to CVEs. Most ICS incidents exploited architectural and protocol-level weaknesses, not software bugs.

Vulnerability identification methods

1. Architecture review

Walk through the zone & conduit diagram and look for:

  • Missing conduit enforcement — any path with no firewall or ACL.
  • Bridge devices — hosts with interfaces in multiple zones.
  • Level-skipping conduits — direct connections that bypass the IDMZ.
  • Shared credentials — service accounts used across zones.

2. Configuration review

For each device in the zone:

  • Default credentials — are factory passwords still active?
  • Unnecessary services — are HTTP, Telnet, FTP, SNMP enabled but unused?
  • Open ports — are any ports open that are not required by the process function?
  • Firmware version — is the firmware current? Are there known advisories?

3. Passive network analysis

Capture traffic on a SPAN port and analyse:

  • Protocol inventory — which protocols are actually in use? Are any unexpected?
  • Communication patterns — which devices talk to which? Do any cross zone boundaries unexpectedly?
  • Broadcast traffic — excessive broadcasts can indicate misconfigured VLANs or legacy protocols.

4. Vendor advisory review

For each device vendor and model, check:

  • ICS-CERT / CISA advisories — search by vendor name at cisa.gov/ics-advisories.
  • Vendor PSIRT bulletins — Siemens ProductCERT, Schneider PSIRT, Rockwell PSIRT.
  • CVE databases — NVD, Vulners, VulnDB.
SourceURLUpdate frequency
CISA ICS Advisoriescisa.gov/ics-advisoriesWeekly
Siemens ProductCERTsiemens.com/certMonthly
Schneider PSIRTse.com/ww/en/work/support/cybersecurityMonthly
NVDnvd.nist.govContinuous

5. Active testing (with extreme caution)

Active vulnerability scanning and penetration testing are high-risk activities in OT. Before any active test:

  • Obtain written authorisation from the plant operator and the safety team.
  • Schedule during a planned outage or with the process in a safe state.
  • Use OT-aware scanning tools (Tenable.ot, Claroty, Dragos) that understand ICS protocols and rate-limit their probes.
  • Have a rollback plan in case a device faults.

Worked example

A penetration tester ran a Nessus scan against a Modbus/TCP endpoint. The scan's TCP RST flood triggered a watchdog timeout on the PLC, which faulted and stopped executing its control programme. The process ran open-loop for 12 seconds before a safety interlock tripped the plant. The tester's report included the finding — but also a P1 incident report.

Documenting vulnerabilities

For each vulnerability, record:

FieldDescriptionExample
IDUnique identifierV-01
ZoneWhich zone is affectedZone 1 (Process Control)
AssetWhich specific assetS7-1200 PLC #1
DescriptionWhat the weakness isS7comm protocol has no authentication; any device on the VLAN can read/write PLC memory
SourceHow it was identifiedArchitecture review + CISA advisory ICSA-21-194-02
CVE (if applicable)CVE identifierN/A (protocol-level weakness)
ExploitabilityHow easily can it be exploitedHigh — no special tools required; mbtget suffices

Linking vulnerabilities to threat scenarios

Each vulnerability is paired with the threat scenarios from lesson 1.1 to form a threat × vulnerability pair. These pairs are the input to consequence and likelihood scoring in the next lesson.

Threat scenario: Cybercriminal reaches Zone 1 via compromised engineering conduit. Vulnerability: S7comm has no authentication. Combined scenario: Attacker can read and write PLC registers to modify chemical dosing setpoints.

Key Takeaways

  1. OT vulnerabilities include protocol-level weaknesses, default credentials, and architectural flaws — not just CVEs.
  2. Use five methods: architecture review, configuration review, passive network analysis, vendor advisory review, and (carefully) active testing.
  3. Active scanning on OT networks requires written authorisation, OT-aware tools, and a rollback plan.
  4. Document each vulnerability with zone, asset, description, source, and exploitability.
  5. Pair each vulnerability with relevant threat scenarios to form the input for risk scoring.

Knowledge Check

3 questions — test your understanding before moving on.

  1. Q1.In OT, what types of weaknesses count as vulnerabilities beyond software CVEs?

    • Only software bugs with assigned CVE numbers.
    • Protocol-level weaknesses (e.g. Modbus has no auth), default credentials, architectural flaws (flat VLANs), and process-knowledge gaps.
    • Only hardware failures covered by the warranty.
    • Only vulnerabilities that have been publicly exploited.

    OT vulnerabilities include protocol-level design weaknesses, default credentials, architectural flaws like flat VLANs and bridge devices, and human-layer gaps. Most major ICS incidents exploited architectural and protocol-level weaknesses, not software CVEs.

  2. Q2.Why must active vulnerability scanning on OT networks be done with extreme caution?

    • Because active scanning is always illegal.
    • Because a scan's traffic patterns can crash legacy PLCs, causing watchdog faults and process trips.
    • Because active scanning reveals the plant's IP addresses to the internet.
    • Because active scanning deletes PLC programs.

    Legacy PLCs have limited network stacks. A SYN scan, service enumeration, or TCP RST flood can trigger a watchdog timeout, causing the PLC to fault and stop executing its control programme. Active testing requires written authorisation, OT-aware tools, and a rollback plan.

  3. Q3.What is the primary source for tracking vendor-specific ICS vulnerabilities?

    • Social media and hacker forums.
    • CISA ICS Advisories, vendor PSIRTs (Siemens ProductCERT, Schneider PSIRT), and NVD.
    • The PLC's built-in diagnostic screen.
    • Annual penetration test reports.

    CISA publishes weekly ICS advisories, major vendors (Siemens, Schneider, Rockwell) publish monthly PSIRT bulletins, and NVD provides continuous CVE tracking. Monitoring these sources is a core activity of any OT security programme.